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COMMENTARY

Without Improved Security, Biodefense Laboratories
May Double as Arsenals for Terrorists
Jim Shen

An American public, already edgy from the September 11*’’ attacks, quickly found itself
having to deal with another terrorist attack in the form of the so-called “Amerithrax” attacks of
September and October 2001. Five were killed and 17 fell ill to anthrax distributed via United
States mail.* The federal government responded by spending generously on anti-bioterrorism
measures, such as the construction of biodefense research laboratories. Programs such as Pro
ject Bioshield, which devoted $5.6 billion to fighting “potential agents of bioterror,” illustrated
President Bush’s commitment to develop countermeasures against potential biological attack.^
In all, $41 billion has been spent on bioterror research since 2002.^ Private companies, which
had previously considered this research unprofitable, joined in with their own biodefense re
search ventures."*
However, despite the rapid proliferation of these laboratories and the large amount of fund
ing allocated to them, security measures and oversight remain inadequate. A 2008 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that the federal government was unaware of the
number of BSL-3 laboratories - the class of biosafety laboratory at which potentially lethal
pathogens are studied - that even existed.^’^ A 2004 survey was able to identify 598 laboratories
at 245 facilities reporting BSL-3 capability. Furthermore, this figure likely underestimates the
actual number of BSL-3 laboratories, as more than half of the contacted facilities did not re
spond and no federal facilities were surveyed at all.^ To be sure, the amount of laboratory space
is considerable. The 2008 GAO report also pointed out poor perimeter security measures at two
BSL-4 laboratories. Because BSL-4 laboratories study potentially lethal pathogens for which
there is no vaccine or cure, they require even stricter
(security measures than the BSL-3 laboratories.^ Yet,
one of the two BSL-4 laboratories had no security
In 2004, more than
cameras performing any live monitoring at all.^

6,000 laboratories
around the world re
ceived samples of an
H2N2 influenza virus
that was responsible
for between one and
four million fatalities
in the late 1950s."

It is of the utmost importance that the government
secures these laboratories. If infectious agents were
to be accidentally released, it would be yet another
example of a surprisingly comrnon occurrence. In
2004, more than 6,000 laboratories around the world
received samples of an H2N2 influenza virus that
was responsible for between one and four million
fatalities in the late 1950s.^ Earlier in 2004, employ
ees of the Children’s Hospital Oaj^land Research In
stitute in California were accidentally exposed to live
anthrax.^

If infectious agents were to be weaponized and used in a terrorist attack, the implications
could be devastating. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have listed anthrax as a
Category A bioterrorism agent, the most threatening class of bioterrorism agent.'® Releasing a
23

Jim Shen: Without Improved Security, Biodefense Laboratories May Double as Arsenals for Terrorists

few hundred pounds of anthrax into the air over a densely populated area could sicken tens of
thousands of people.^ Thankfully, weaponizing potentially lethal organisms such as anthrax is a
project that poses significant technical and logistical obstacles.” However, with a combination
of poor security and a well-placed accomplice among the 15,000 employees nationwide with
access to weaponizable pathogens, would-be biological terrorists would find that the hardest
work has been done Jor them.^
The existence of these vulnerabilities may lead one to question the organizations that are
responsible for laboratory security. Institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) at BSL-3, BSL-4,
and other biocontainment laboratories exist to ensure safe operation and oversight in accor
dance with a set of NIH-established rules called the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Re
combinant DNA Molecules}^ The NIH stipulates that any institution with at least one NIHfiinded project subject to the Guidelines must adhere to the Guidelines for every other such pro
ject whether that project receives NIH funding or not.” However, a recent study found that
many facilities in the private sector were not compliant with this rule. In all, 75% of major pri
vate biotechnology companies are not overseen by any NIH-recognized IBC at all. Making mat
ters worse, the laboratories studying the most dangerous agents were not spared from this lack
of oversight. Of the BSL-3 laboratories identified in this study, 98% had not subjected all of
their federal BSL-3 research grants to IBC review.”
This may be regarded as a natural consequence of the NIH’s reluctance to enforce compli
ance. As of 2008, the NIH has never withdrawn funding for a project based on an institution’s
noncompliance with the Guidelines. Even if the NIH began to withdraw funding from noncompliant institutions, projects funded by non-NIH sources would be unaffected since they lie out
side the jurisdiction of the Guidelines. Laboratories receiving outside funding are only encour
aged, but not required, to maintain IBCs.” Clearly, the scope of the IBC system is not sufficient
to properly oversee all laboratories nationwide studying dangerous agents. The domain of its
authority is not comprehensive enough and enforcement is lax within that domain.
An expanded biosafety research sector is one of the legacies of the Bush administration.
Support and criticism for the current scope and nature of federally funded biosafety research
runs somewhat along partisan lines. However, one thing that all should be able to agree upon is
that as long as these laboratories exist, they must be secure. Rectifying the current situation is
not an insignificant task. In addition to the relatively small jobs of constructing more robust pe
rimeter security measures, larger-scale reforms to the institutions that oversee the operations of
these laboratories must be enacted. Otherwise, these expensive laboratories would double as
storehouses of potential weapons to be accidentally or intentionally used against the American
population. Without proper security, the billions of dollars spent funding these biodefense ef
forts will have only exacerbated a national security risk.
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